Wilsonian Ambitions for American Engagement in the First Gulf War by Cox, Ashley
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in History Compass by Wiley. Published version 
available at:  http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/hic3.12365/abstract  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24317/  
 
Wilsonian Ambitions for American Engagement in the First Gulf 
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Abstract 
 
American engagement with the world is one of the most important factors in international relations. 
One leading example is the Wilsonian School, which has a long tradition of influencing American 
foreign policy. With the 25th anniversary of Operation Desert Storm, this article will review the 
Wilsonian influences that led the United States to intervene in the First Gulf War. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, visions have differed dramatically in terms of how the United States 
should conduct foreign policy and engage with the rest of the world. These debates continue to be 
dominated by a clash between a Jeffersonian neo-isolationist call to withdraw from international 
conflicts and a more hawkish interventionist vision of American primacy in foreign affairs. The 
Wilsonian tradition has arguably received comparatively little discussion by scholars despite the 
important role it has played in the history of American foreign policy. As we mark the 25th 
anniversary of operation Desert Storm, this article argues that the Wilsonian framework is helpful in 
understanding why President Bush entered the First Gulf War of 1991. The article begins with a 
discussion of what constitutes the Wilsonian ideology in terms of its key principles and assumptions 
before presenting the utility of the Wilsonian viewpoint in explaining this conflict. 
Introduction 
 
The 2016 election in the United States showed two opposing vision of foreign policy and engage with 
the rest of the world. These debates were dominated by a clash between a Jeffersonian neo-
isolationist call to withdraw from the world or a more hawkish interventionist vision of American 
primacy. These are not the only foreign policy traditions in the history of the United States, and it is 
perhaps the Wilsonian tradition that has seen the least airing in recent discussion. Thus, this author 
believes it is a good time to revisit the role Wilsonianism has played in the history of foreign policy of 
the United States. As we mark the 25th anniversary of operation Desert Storm, this article will show 
that the Wilsonian framework plays a key role in understanding why President Bush entered the 
First Gulf War of 1991. Although we can see that Wilsonianism was not the only factor at work in 
President Bush's decision, we can see that it is an important and motivating factor often overlooked 
in the contemporary discourse on the conflict. This article begins with a discussion of what 
constitutes the Wilsonian ideology, its key principles and assumptions. This will by necessity be a 
truncated discussion focusing on the two key pillars of international law and democracy promotion. 
Finally, it will demonstrate the utility of the Wilsonian lens in explaining this conflict. 
A Definition of Wilsonianism 
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What constitutes Wilsonianism is a contested subject amongst scholars of the history of foreign 
policy of the United States.1 In this section, we will discuss these concepts and produce a 
synthesised definition of Wilsonianism to aid in our understanding of the First Gulf War. 
Wilsonianism as an approach to foreign policy rests on two key pillars, the first is democracy 
promotion and the second collective security grounded in a rules-based international system. In this 
section, we will discuss each pillar and how they form the basis of the Wilsonian ideology. 
 
The first of which is democracy promotion, that the United States has both an ideological 
commitment and a security interest in promoting democracy in other countries. In recent years, this 
concept has become associated with the neo-conservative groups with in US policy discourse.2 
While the neoconservatives have clearly been at the fore front of making the argument for 
democracy promotion since the First Gulf War. It is the Wilsonian School, this paper contends, that 
will demonstrate how to help us better understand a key part of the decision to liberate Kuwait in 
1991. This article will use the definitions presented by Tony Smith and Walter Russell Mead to 
produce a synthesised definition of the term. According to Mead, Wilsonianism is grounded in the 
missionary tradition of the United States.3 By drawing on the precepts of democratic peace theory,4 
Wilsonianism as an ideology posits that an international system that consists purely of democracies 
will not resort to violence as democratic governments do not attack each other. This reflects the 
peaceful nature of democratic states and a domestic political culture of compromise to achieve 
political aims. As such, we do not need to view Wilsonianism as an idealistic philosophy. Smith 
argues that the United States sought to further its ‘national security by encouraging likeminded 
democratic states to come into existence throughout the world.’5 Wilsonianism also posits ‘that the 
United States has the right and the duty to change the rest of the world's behaviour, and that the 
United States can and should concern itself not only with the way other countries conduct their 
international affairs, but with their domestic policies as well.’6 It is understanding this belief in the 
both the utility and the legitimacy of United States forging an international system that is line with 
its own preferences that will add to our understanding of George H.W. Bush's decision to liberate 
Kuwait. 
 
The second key pillar is that of collective security and the importance of a rules-based international 
system. Wilsonian's believe that until the international system consists entirely of democratic states 
the conflict caused by anarchy within the international system is best addressed by a system that 
would deter aggression by presenting would be aggressors with an overwhelming international 
coalition. This will shift the cost benefit analysis of any potential aggression in favour of a diplomatic 
solution. It is on the issue of collective security that Wilsonian's part ways with their democracy 
promoting brethren in the neo-conservative camp. Although Wilsonians may see the United States 
as primus inter pares. They believe that there is a fundamental advantage in building a rules-based 
international system and vigorous enforcement of these rules through the use of international 
organisations. This is evidenced in Wilsonian support for the League of Nations and its successor the 
United Nations. Both of these organisations are premised on the fundamental illegitimacy of 
territorial expansion through military means. The United Nations had been created to prevent the 
mistakes of the interwar years and to meet any aggression with an internationally organised 
response.7 As the most powerful state in the international system, it would be the United States 
responsibility to enforce these rules and act as the final guarantor of collective security. These two 
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pillars present markedly different priorities than explanations that are grounded in strategic and 
economic factors that have traditionally been used to explain the First Gulf War. In the following 
sections, this paper will show that the Wilsonian framework adds to our understanding of this 
conflict. 
Wilsonianism and the First Gulf War 
 
The First Gulf War is a particularly apt example to investigate how Wilsonian preferences influence 
American decision-making as the conflict takes place at a time of change in the international system. 
The Cold War had made the functioning of collective security difficult. With its demise, there was 
renewed hope among Wilsonians that the Security Council would be able to cooperate and act to 
ensure international security. The first test of this new system was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This 
conflict presented a clear case of an aggressor crossing an international boarder, a situation that 
collective security was supposed to prevent. It was clear that President Bush found this invasion 
objectionable, as he recalls ‘at some point it came through to me that this was not a matter of 
shades of grey, or of trying to see the other side's point of view. It was good versus evil, right versus 
wrong.’8 The Wilsonian School echoes in these words, as the need to right an obvious wrong are 
hallmarks of this school. The minutes of the National Security Council of 5 August 1990 show that 
both military and non-military options are discussed. President Bush says ‘My sense is that Iraq does 
not believe we will act. Saddam is riding an emotional high. Maybe if he sees it is not business as 
usual he will change.’9 This response is in line with the Wilsonian framework, not a rush to war but a 
clear understanding that if the international order is not restored then the United States must 
respond. 
 
The second element the Wilsonian School adds to this conflict is an understanding of the importance 
that intervention in the Persian Gulf was driven by George H. W. Bush's belief that a new American-
led internationalism would replace the Cold War adversarial system. In the future, aggressive states 
would be met with collective action lead by the United States. The New World Order is a term that 
lacks clear definition, but it represents a policy of American-led internationalism based around the 
co-operation of nation states. This was an attempt to move to a more collective form of security: 
 
In the minds of key leaders worldwide, collective security stood at the center of the new world order. 
In this sense, it was vital to prospects for creating a more stable, predictable, safe world.10 
This is clearly a policy derived from the collective security pillar of the Wilsonian School. It is also 
clear that President Bush saw the United Nations and democratic norms as the foundation of this 
new order: ‘The world can therefore seize this opportunity to fulfil the long-held promise of a new 
world order-where brutality will go unrewarded, and aggression will meet collective resistance.’11 
This theme of America leading the world in collective action, with the United Nations as the 
instrument through which this is achieved, is the pinnacle of this pillar of the Wilsonian school. 
President Bush shows his support for this approach in many of the speeches and interviews that the 
president makes regarding this issue.12 In the same address, he articulates his view that: 
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Among the nations of the world, only the United States of America has both the moral standing and 
the means to back it up. We're the only nation on this Earth that could assemble the forces of peace. 
This is the burden of leadership and the strength that has made America the beacon of freedom in a 
searching world.13 
This argument is supported by Engel, who argues that: 
 
Bush believed it was American-led international resolve and America-led leadership of an 
international coalition of democracies that had secured the great victories of Bush's own youth and 
that had set the stage for the free world's triumph over communism. The grand challenges of his 
own post-Cold War world would, he believed, be best won in a similarly grand and international 
fashion.14 
The decision to get a resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force, rather than use of the 
collective self-defence provision of the United Nations charter, lends further credence to the notion 
of this American-led internationalism.15 Smith argues that President Bush ‘showed his respect for 
the importance of international institutions. He involved the Soviet Union, and so seemed to be 
paving the way for a later collective security agreement with Moscow.’16 This position is supported 
by John Ballard who argues that: 
 
Scowcroft was concerned that the other policymakers within the NSC were not seeing the bigger 
picture he felt that this first major intervention of the post-Cold War world had enormous 
ramifications, and in their discussions the president agreed with him.17 
Miller and Yetiv argue that the Gulf crisis itself was the catalyst for Bush's vision of a New World 
Order and that the situation clarified the need for American-led internationalism in a way that had 
not been clear before: 
 
The end of the cold war and the Gulf crisis contributed fundamentally to the development of the 
concept of the new world order. The end of the cold war created conditions that made a new world 
order possible in theory.18 
In their argument, the ‘Gulf Crisis allowed the New World Order concept to be developed and 
executed. Indeed, prior to the crisis the notion of a new era was in the air, but it was ambiguous 
nascent and unproven.’19 
 
The decline of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the decline in the Soviet Union could have 
triggered a unilateral response to Saddam's invasion. It was George H. W. Bush's concept of an 
international response that moulded the attempts to generate a collective international effort to 
resolve the crisis. The Wilsonian framework furthers our understanding of why this is an important 
shift. As the domestic nature of the Soviet state changed so did the Wilsonian's view of how 
disruptive a state it would be to international peace. Those that had supported the democracy 
promotion pillar of the Wilsonian school had long argued that it was non-democratic states who 
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were the fundamental cause of conflict within the international system. The end of the Cold War and 
Soviet reforms seemed to validate these assumptions. At the Houston economic summit, the G7 
declaration announced: 
 
We welcome the intention of the Soviet Union to move toward a democratic political system, as well 
as Soviet attempts to reform their economy along market principles. We commit ourselves to 
working with the Soviet Union to assist its efforts to create an open society, a pluralistic democracy, 
and a market-oriented economy. Such changes will enable the Soviet Union to fulfill its 
responsibilities in the community of nations founded on these principles. We are heartened by 
indications that a constructive dialogue is underway between the Soviet government and the Baltic 
states, and we urge all sides to continue this dialogue in a democratic spirit.20 
With the Soviet Union no longer acting as an obstruction in the United Nations, Wilsonians could 
further the second pillar of the school and pursue a collective security approach. If we return to the 
concept of the New World Order, and its role in President Bush's response to the crisis as a collective 
security response, there existed a need to ensure the Soviets were comfortable with the function of 
the system as this would be an important part in getting the system to work. President Bush says in 
conversation with President Gorbachev in June of 1991: 
 
We seek a democratic, market-oriented Soviet Union, integrated into the world economy, having 
found a resolution of the problems between the center and the republics. The latter is essential for 
capital flows. We also seek cooperation on all global issues. I know your historical relations with Iraq 
and appreciate the bold decision you made on the Gulf.21 
It was important to the Bush administration that the response to the Gulf crisis could be used as a 
template for how an international crisis should be resolved. To this end, the Bush Administration 
halted ground operations, whilst significant assets of the Iraqi military were still intact. The United 
States had followed its mandate from the United Nations and not made the mistakes that it had 
during the Korean War of extending the mission to removing the aggressor from power. If the 
‘United States wanted the Gulf crisis to set a precedent for collective action, it made sense to stay 
within the parameters of that mandate.’22 It was this desire to make internationalism under 
American leadership work, which was part of the decision not to try to remove Saddam, and as a 
result as Mead argues ‘Wilsonians could call it a war for international law, with the U.N. Security 
Council acting as Wilsonians has always hoped it would.’23 Bush makes it clear when he announces 
the suspension of hostilities ‘No one country can claim this victory as its own. It was not only a 
victory for Kuwait but a victory for all the coalition partners. This is a victory for the United Nations, 
for all mankind, for the rule of law, and for what is right.’24 
 
President Bush reiterates this position in a speech to the United Nations General assembly: 
 
This is a new and different world. Not since 1945 have we seen the real possibility of using the 
United Nations as it was designed: as a center for international collective security. The changes in 
the Soviet Union have been critical to the emergence of a stronger United Nations. The U.S.-Soviet 
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relationship is finally beyond containment and confrontation, and now we seek to fulfil the promise 
of mutually shared understanding. The long twilight struggle that for 45 years has divided Europe, 
our two nations, and much of the world has come to an end. Much has changed over the last 2 years. 
The Soviet Union has taken many dramatic and important steps to participate fully in the community 
of nations. And when the Soviet Union agreed with so many of us here in the United Nations to 
condemn the aggression of Iraq, there could be no doubt – no doubt then – that we had, indeed, put 
four decades of history behind us. We are hopeful that the machinery of the United Nations will no 
longer be frozen by the divisions that plagued us during the cold war, that at last – long last – we can 
build new bridges and tear down old walls, that at long last we will be able to build a new world 
based on an event for which we have all hoped: an end to the cold war.25 
These comments above demonstrate both of the key pillars of the Wilsonian School. In this speech, 
it is President Bush's assertion that the change in the relationship between the superpowers is due 
to its change toward a more democratic form of government, a clearly Wilsonian explanation for the 
end to the confrontation. This speech also demonstrates the role of the Wilsonian approach in the 
President's resolution of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and his support for a collective security, 
through the United Nations. For this Wilsonian vision to work successfully, Bush would need to 
ensure that the great powers of the post-Cold War world would co-operate. This was particularly 
important to the Permanent Five members of the United Nations Security Council. If the United 
Nations was to be the body to co-ordinate this post-Cold War it could not suffer from the deadlock it 
had experienced during the Cold War period. Thus, through the Gulf Crisis, we see the continual 
consultations with the Soviet Union despite its weakened state. It is further testament to George 
H.W Bush's vision that the post-Cold War period would be one of consensus finding. If the president 
came out strongly against the invasion and the United Nations demanded Saddam withdraw his 
forces and subsequently the invasion became a fait accompli then it would be proven that the 
United Nation was no more capable of acting in the post-Cold War world than it had been in the 
Cold War. The Wilsonian framework will show why this contributed to America's decision to 
intervene. Understanding that the core of Bush's foreign policy and vision for the post-Cold War 
world was internationalism under American leadership is a critical part of understanding the 
American response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It is the Wilsonian framework that adds to the 
understanding of why this is important. 
The Post-Cold war era and the New World Order 
 
The focus of the Bush administration's response was on restoring Kuwait to the status quo ante-
bellum, defeating Iraqi aggression and trying to limit the disruption to the United States economy. 
This is not to argue that the president was not interested in democratic expansion, but the New 
World Order was only one of the approaches taken by the United States to post-Cold War conflicts. 
It is important to remember that the First Gulf War took place in a period of transition from a 
multipolar order to the unipolar of the post-Cold War period. The Cold War was over, and the Soviet 
Union was drawing its last breaths. Engel argues that the end of the Cold War was ‘a validation of 
American values and policies.’26 President Bush was not alone in his assumption that the tide of 
history was flowing towards democracy- many scholars, such as Francis Fukuyama, heralded the end 
of communism as a new phase in international relations where a democratic peace would replace 
the competitive international system, an argument the Wilsonian School had long made.27 This 
meant that there was little need for active regime change in non-democratic countries. Simply by 
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waiting these regimes out the U.S. would prevail much as it had done in the Cold War. Only if a 
nation upset the status quo, such as Iraq had, would America need to act. President Bush argued 
that: 
 
I did not think we should impose democracy on Kuwaitis-rather; it was something that had to grow 
from within. We could not allow a dictator to be the one to alter their domestic political structure. 
Above all, we could not give Saddam any measure of political gain from the invasion. Had we insisted 
on imposing democracy as part of the restoration of sovereignty, Saddam could portray himself as a 
catalyst for Kuwaiti political reform.28 
Tony Smith agrees with this assessment, as he argues: 
 
Democracy was not the issue; neither in Iraq nor in Kuwait could there be much hope of fostering so 
Western a style of government. Nevertheless, here was a challenge to regional stability in an area of 
special interest to the United States, so that in acting decisively, Bush might give still more shape to 
what he now called a “new world order” to be crafted by American leadership.29 
Despite the long-term failure of the New World Order, which goes beyond the scope of this article, 
the administration's actions in Kuwait show an attempt to establish this order, through an insistence 
on the respect for national sovereignty as the basis of this order. This brought him in to conflict with 
the French Premier Mitterrand who said ‘I would not risk the death of one single French soldier if it 
was exclusively in order to restore an absolutist system.’30 
 
It may seem counter intuitive to suggest that the Wilsonian School would not wish to install 
democracy in the nation of Kuwait.31 This conflict demonstrates the ascendency of the collective 
security pillar in this conflict, ensuring that the United Nations would be able to act as the 
organisation to facilitate this collective security. As such it was important in gaining the support of 
regional powers for the action to return the Amir to power. Although the democracy promotion 
pillar of Wilsonianism appears to have taken a back seat in this conflict, we can also view this in the 
light of the successful approach to the Cold War. As we have discussed above, the events in Eastern 
Europe had presented a vindication of the Wilsonian School's approach with evidence of the 
inevitability of the victory of democratic government of communism.32 The President in a joint press 
conference with British Prime Minister John Major comments: 
 
What's different is we are not facing one aggressive international Communist force; that's what's 
entirely different. Democracy is on the move in these various countries you talk about. I don't know 
that any one of them wants to now turn its back on democracy, and some of those who have not 
been particularly democratic are saying they are.33 
Supporters of Wilsonian ideals had waited over forty years for democracy to spread to Eastern 
Europe, it could bide its time for it to reach the Middle East. The Wilsonian approach is a patient one. 
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This willingness to allow democracy to spread at its own pace also shows a distinct difference from 
the neoconservative approach. Those that support the Wilsonian approach are far more sceptical 
over the efficacy of the concept of imposing democracy at the point of a bayonet.34 The above 
section shows that the Wilsonian School had a significant impact on the United States actions, and 
that the strategic and economic motivations do not, on their own, explain this conflict Wilsonianism 
is a powerful influence on the president's decision, and we must consider this influence to fully 
understand this conflict. 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, we can see that there is significant evidence that George H.W. Bush was motivated by 
a desire to create a rules-based international system, where the United States would lead the world 
in collective action against aggressors. In this New World Order, the United Nations would also take 
a central role in providing a collective security function. This was in line with the principles of the 
Wilsonian framework that had always supported the use of an international organisation to keep the 
peace. 
 
The Bush administration had hoped that in light of the Cold War ending the democratic norms of the 
West would become global democratic norms. This conflict can be seen as a way to show that those 
norms that included resolving your differences with other states through peaceful means and not 
through conflict would be enforced in the post-Cold War world. 
 
Many have argued that this intended New World Order was nothing more than a cover for post-Cold 
War American hegemony and that if a New World Order was important then the subsequent Bush 
years would have seen a more concerted effort to establish this order. However, the events of this 
period show great restraint by the United States on how it used its power, especially with the final 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, as well as the large humanitarian effort in Somalia in 1992. 
 
This is not to dismiss the clear threat that Iraq presented to the region, which of course played a 
significant part in shaping the American response to the crisis. During the crisis, the president went 
to great lengths to consult other world leaders and to attempt to find a non-military solution to Iraqi 
aggression. But at no point did the president consider that there would be any solution that left Iraq 
in control of Kuwait. By revisiting these events using the Wilsonian framework, we can gain 
understanding of why the threat was resolved the way it was. Finally, it was a great challenge for 
President Bush to keep the coalition together, with various internal tensions threatening to tear it 
apart. Thus, if the United States had not responded as it did with the genuine threat of force and 
acted when it did to forcibly remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, then the consensus may have 
collapsed at which point the whole sanctions regime would have fallen apart and Iraq could reap the 
rewards of aggression. It is the larger Wilsonian framework that helps us understand why the 
president was motivated to act. 
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